以汽車使用者的動機差異來分析國內車體保險市場不對稱訊息的問題

以汽車使用者的動機差異來分析國內車體保險市場不對稱訊息的問題
To Analyze the Problem of Asymmetric Information in Taiwan’s Automobile Insurance by the Different Motivations of Using Cars between Social Needs and Private Needs


蔡英哲 Tsai, Ying Che

鄭安峰 Cheng, An Feng








以汽車使用者的動機差異來分析國內車體保險市場不對稱訊息的問題
To Analyze the Problem of Asymmetric Information in Taiwan’s Automobile Insurance by the Different Motivations of Using Cars between Social Needs and Private Needs



本文摘要
由於法人車主與自然人車主，使用汽車的動機存在明顯差異進而影響彼此出險的行為與購買保障的高低，本文主要觀察理賠機率與保障之間，是否存在顯著的正向關係，且兩類車主正向關係的差異是否顯著。研究發現，(1)不管是甲式相對於乙式樣本、甲式相對於丙式樣本或乙式相對於丙式樣本，理賠機率與保障之間皆存在正向相關；(2)甲式相對於乙式樣本，自然人車主道德危險的情況較嚴重，使得正向關係顯著較高，乙式相對於丙式樣本，法人車主逆選擇的情況較嚴重，使得正向關係顯著較高；(3)當理賠金額增加，保險公司比較無法利用優勢資訊來解決法人車主因逆選擇所產生的不對稱訊息的問題。

Abstract
Practically, we have well known that the obviously different motivations of using cars between social needs and private needs make various drivers’ claim behaviors and coverage choice. By jointly analyzing the empirical data, we show that there totally exist asymmetric information problems among samples of policy type A versus policy type B, policy type A versus policy type C, or policy type B versus policy type C, that among sample of policy type A versus policy type B the car owners of private needs having great moral hazard problem exist more significant asymmetric information problem than ones of social needs but among sample of policy type B versus policy type C the car owners of social needs having great adverse selection problem exist more significant asymmetric information problem than ones of private needs, and that insurers should lack the powerful scheme to solve the problem of asymmetric information derived from car owners of social needs having great adverse selection problem when severity increases.

關鍵字: 不對稱訊息, 汽車保險，JEL分類代號: G22, G32
Key words: Asymmetric Information, Automobile Insurance, JEL classification: G22, G32